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Note
After Mallard v. United States: The Federal
Courts' Inherent Power to Appoint
Representation for Indigent Civil
Litigants
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the power of American courts to appoint represen-
tation for indigent litigants has rested upon either statutory author-
ity' or the inherent powers of the judiciary.2 Today, both the
1. With respect to statutory authority in the states, see Fisch, Coercive Appointments
of Counsel in Civil Cases In Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 Mo. L.
REV. 527 (1985). Fisch details the development of the modem in forma pauperis statute,
developing its origin from 11 Hen. VII, c. 12 (1495), the first known statutory provision
for free judicial services for poor persons in civil cases. Fisch, supra, at 543-44 & n.79.
Fisch then traces the development of the early American state and territorial statutes that
codified versions of this in forma pauperis statute, id. at 547-51, noting that all but one of
these early statutes expressly prohibited attorneys from taking a fee, id. at 547. See also
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1989) (explaining that prior
to the twentieth century, many American state statutes specified that courts could assign
or appoint counsel). See generally Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 756 (1980) (illustrating that, as of 1980, 34 state jurisdictions pro-
vided for some court appointment of counsel). Shapiro further provides that 18 states
seem to have an "enforceable duty to represent an indigent for little or no compensation
when ordered to do so." Id.
With respect to federal statutory authority, the first federal in forma pauperis statute,
entitled "An act providing when plaintiff may sue as a poor person and when counsel
shall be assigned by the court," was passed in 1892 and provided "[tihat the court may
request any attorney of the court to represent such poor person, if it deems the cause
worthy of trial." Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252 (current version codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988)).
2. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 14 (1990) (defining "[tihe inherent power of a court [a]s that
which is necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of the court's jurisdiction, for the
preservation of its independence and integrity, and for the complete administration of
justice") (footnotes omitted); see also People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 29,
219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966) (Illinois Supreme Court held that when appointed counsel
incurred excessive financial burdens in the defense of indigent clients, "the [trial] court's
inherent power to appoint counsel also necessarily includes the power to enter an appro-
priate order ensuring that counsel do not suffer an intolerable sacrifice and burden and
that the indigent defendants' right to counsel is protected"); Knox County Council v.
State, 217 Ind. 493, 512, 29 N.E.2d 405, 413 (1940). The court in Knox stated:
The conclusion seems unavoidable that it is the duty of courts to see that
criminal cases are tried; that these cases cannot be legally tried unless the de-
fendant, if he is a pauper, is provided with counsel; that attorneys cannot be
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federal and state courts' ability to obtain representation for indi-
gents largely has been codified,3 and a statutory right to an ap-
pointment of counsel often turns upon whether the nature of the
action is criminal,4 quasi-criminal,5 or civil. 6
In federal civil actions, appointment of counsel to indigent liti-
gants is governed by section 1915(d) of the Judicial Code, which
regulates the assignment of counsel in federal in forma pauperis
compelled to serve without compensation; and therefore that, in order to con-
duct a legal trial, the court must have power to appoint counsel, and order that
such counsel be compensated if necessary; and that the right to provide com-
pensation cannot be made to depend upon the will of the Legislature or of the
county council.
Id.; see also Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d 761 (1975) (Ne-
braska Supreme Court held district court had inherent authority to appoint counsel to
represent indigent misdemeanor defendants, and further, that such appointment carried
with it an obligation on the part of the county to pay the appointed counsel reasonable
fees and expenses).
3. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 547-55 (tracing the development of state appointment
statutes, particularly the populist development of Indiana).
4. It is well recognized that the sixth amendment provides a constitutional right for
indigent criminal defendants to receive appointed counsel. For the historical evolution of
this concept, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requiring appointed counsel in a
state capital case, noting that the due process right to hearing logically extends to require
the right to an attorney); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (re-emphasizing
the sixth amendment importance of assistance of counsel in criminal cases); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending Powell to require representation by counsel
in all felony criminal cases, not just capital prosecutions) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942) (appointments in criminal cases requiring only a totality-of-the-circum-
stances analysis)). In addition, see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988) (codifying the right to ap-
pointment of counsel in criminal cases and providing for compensation to those
appointed).
5. There is also some provision for mandatory appointments in the area of "quasi-
criminal" proceedings--civil actions that potentially affect the personal liberty of a party.
"[Q]uasi-criminal" actions are those "technically classified as 'civil,'... [but which] are,
in reality, hybrid or quasi-criminal in nature. Since they directly involve deprivation of
life and liberty, they can be allied with criminal proceedings." Note, The Right to Coun-
sel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1322 & n.3 (1966). Examples cited
include collateral attack proceedings, juvenile hearings, and commitments to mental insti-
tutions. Id.; see also Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J.
545, 545 & n.2 (1967) (citing as further examples of quasi-criminal proceedings: habeas
corpus, coram nobis, probation revocation, and deportation proceedings). Finally, con-
sider Martin-Trigona v. Lavien, 737 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[tlhe sixth amend-
ment right to counsel of course extends only to criminal and quasi-criminal
proceedings").
6. Section 1915(d) of the Judicial Code authorizes assignment of counsel in in forma
pauperis proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988); see also Mallard, 490 U.S. at 306-
07 (listing statutes that authorize appointment of counsel in civil statutory actions, in-
cluding 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (appointment in Indian child custody proceedings), 42
U.S.C. § 1971(f) (assignment for alleged contempt in voting rights cases), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-3(a) (appointment in civil rights action seeking injunction against discrimination
or segregation in places of public accommodation), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (ap-
pointment in Title VII proceedings)).
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proceedings.7 Section 1915(d) provides that federal courts "may
request an attorney" to represent the indigent litigant.8
Recently, in Mallard v. United States District Court,9 the United
States Supreme Court held that section 1915(d) does not authorize
mandatory appointments of counsel. " Instead, the Supreme Court
held that federal courts may only request an attorney to serve as
counsel for an indigent civil litigant, but cannot compel him to ac-
cept such service.'" In so holding, the Court specifically declined
to rule on the constitutionality of mandatory appointments 2 or to
decide whether such mandatory appointments, while not statuto-
rily authorized by section 1915(d), are nevertheless within the fed-
eral courts' inherent power.' 3
This Note analyzes the implications of the Mallard holding for
both the judiciary and practicing attorneys. First, consideration is
given to the historical background of both judicial and statutory
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
8. See infra note 28 for a partial reproduction of the statutory text.
9. 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
10. Id. at 310.
11. Id. at 305, 310.
12. Id. at 306 n.6. For a thorough examination of these constitutional issues, see
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 762-77, outlining the constitutional challenges to mandatory
appointment of representation usually made under the first, fifth, thirteenth, and four-
teenth amendments.
The fifth and fourteenth amendment challenges concern appointed counsel receiving
inadequate compensation that may constitute a denial of due process, equal protection, or
a taking without just compensation. Id. at 770-7 1. The issues raised by these challenges
remain unsettled. The argument for the unconstitutionality of mandatory appointments
under these amendments asserts that "[a]n obligation to perform certain work, backed by
the sanction of contempt, professional discipline, or loss of livelihood, is about as direct
an invasion of a person's control over his labor as can be imagined." Id. at 774 (footnote
omitted). Alternatively, the proposition that mandatory appointments without compen-
sation are constitutional is often founded upon "the history and traditions of the bar,
which are said to be understood as a condition of the license to practice, and to the
monopoly of authorized practice conferred on lawyers in exchange for the duty to serve."
Id. at 775-76 (footnote omitted).
The first and thirteenth amendment challenges are not directly related to the issue of
compensation for appointed counsel. Assuming that an appointed attorney is not impris-
oned for his refusal to serve, the thirteenth amendment challenge of involuntary servitude
appears to be the least persuasive of the constitutional challenges. Shapiro agrees with
the Second Circuit's analysis, concluding that "a condition of servitude is within the
[thirteenth] amendment's proscription only when the individual is subjected to physical
restraint or threat of legal confinement as an alternative to service." Id. at 770 & n. 173
(citing United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485-87 (2d Cir. 1964)).
Finally, the first amendment challenge has been made without regard to the appointed
counsel's compensation, and rests upon that counsel's right to freedom of speech and
association. Id. at 762-67; see also, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Mallard v. United States
Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
13. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 308 n.8, 310.
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authority for attorney appointments. Then, analysis of the Mal-
lard opinion will illustrate the Court's current construction of the
federal courts' appointment authority. Finally, this Note will ex-
amine what inherent powers, if any, the federal courts retain after
Mallard to compel an attorney to represent an indigent civil
litigant.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Inherent Judicial Authority
By virtue of its role as a distinct branch of government, the judi-
ciary possesses certain inherent powers that are not derived from
direct constitutional or legislative grants of authority.' 4 Typically,
the inherent authority of the judiciary consists of those powers
"that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice"
within a particular court's jurisdiction.'" Consequently, courts
have invoked their inherent authority to appoint nonjudicial of-
ficers' 6 such as auditors,' 7 technical advisors," and special mas-
ters19 to aid in the administration of justice.
Additionally, inherent judicial authority has been further con-
strued to allow a court to regulate the conduct of its bar.20 Conso-
14. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 79 (1965).
15. Id. Further,
[i]t has been said that courts have inherent power to summon witnesses and
compel their appearance in court, to administer oaths.... to prevent abuse of
process, to provide counsel for the indigent, to have errors in the records cor-
rected, to relieve a party in default, to discipline attorneys at law, to take appro-
priate action in cases of contempt, and to do various other things to maintain
order and to function properly as a court.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
16. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (Brandeis, J.) ("[t]his [inherent]
power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in
the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause").
17. Id. at 314 ("The inherent power of a federal court to invoke such aid is the same
whether the court sits in equity or at law. We conclude, therefore, that the order, in so
far as it appointed the auditor ... was within the power of the court.").
18. Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 162 (D.R.I. 1988) (despite the availabil-
ity of statutory authority, the district court reaffirmed its inherent authority to appoint an
economist to assist in the determination of damages for loss of earning capacity of an
infant injured at birth by the malpractice of a naval obstetrician).
19. In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1499 (11 th Cir.)
(court had inherent authority to appoint a special master to carry out statute authorizing
judicial counsel to investigate improper conduct by a federal judge), cert. denied sub nom.
Hastings v. Godbold, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); Powell v. Ward, 487 F. Supp. 917, 935
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court upheld appointment of a special master to oversee defendants'
compliance with the court's orders), modified, 643 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 832 (1981).
20. Brief of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae, Mallard
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nant with this, courts have appointed counsel, both to represent
the court in contempt proceedings 21 and to represent indigent
litigants.22
With respect to court-appointed representation of indigents, the
caselaw illustrates that, in practice, inherent authority has been in-
voked most often (if not always) by courts to appoint counsel in
criminal cases.23 In making these appointments, the courts have
utilized several broad justifications, most notably the attorney's
duty as an officer of the court24 and the unique nature of the legal
v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Briefs File) (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985)); see also Bleckner v. General
Accident Ins. Co., 713 F. Supp. 642, 653 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court ordering counsel
to take a pro bono representation as punishment for Rule 11 sanctions, citing the majority
opinion in Mallard as well as Justice Stevens's dissent).
21. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) ("it
is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for
disobedience to their orders, authority which necessarily encompasses the ability to ap-
point a private attorney to prosecute the contempt").
22. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 528 ("Itjhe claim of judicial power to appoint counsel
with or without compensation, and a concomitant duty of the lawyer to accept such
appointments, is most often derived from the inherent powers of the judiciary, inferred
from the nature of its constitutionally established role as a separate branch of
government").
23. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) ("[tlhe duty of the trial court
to appoint counsel under such circumstances is clear... ; and its power to do so, even in
the absence of a statute, cannot be questioned"); State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo.
769, 778-79, 174 S.W.2d 181, 184 (1943). The Becker court noted:
Another inherent power possessed by the courts is that of providing counsel
for the indigent. And when the court assigns or requests counsel to represent
an indigent, at least one charged with a crime, it is not only the duty of the
attorney to accept the assignment and act but he is also not at liberty to decline
the appointment except under certain circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Bowe, 698 F.2d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Criminal Justice Act neither "repeals [n]or displaces a court's 'inherent authority to do
those things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice in the exercise of [its]
jurisdiction,' including the power to appoint counsel to represent indigents") (citations
omitted); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 28, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966)
("trial court discharged its duty [to appoint counsel to criminal defendants].., pursuant
to the inherent power of the judiciary to regulate the practice of law and conduct the
orderly administration of justice"); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick,
217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940) (court has inherent authority to appoint counsel in
criminal case but, to be constitutional, the attorney must be compensated); Kovarik v.
County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, -, 224 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1975) (court had inherent
authority to appoint counsel for defendant charged with criminal misdemeanor because
"when we are concerned with a matter so fundamental as the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel in criminal matters, no express [statutory] provision granting such au-
thority is required").
24. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73 ("[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to
render service when required by such an appointment"); Randolph, 35 I11. 2d at 28, 219
N.E.2d at 340 ("attorney is an officer of the court and his license to practice carries with
it the steadfast obligation to serve the court whenever called upon to do so").
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profession. 5
B. Statutory Authority
1. Section 1915: The Federal In Forma Pauperis Statute
While several states possessed in forma pauperis statutes by the
mid-1 800s, 26 the first federal statute was not enacted until 1892.27
The current statute, section 1915 of the Judicial Code, establishes
procedures for all litigants proceeding in forma pauperis.28 In
practice, however, section 1915 is applied only to civil actions, as
the right to an appointment of counsel in criminal cases has been
separately codified.29
25. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 527-28. Although Fisch specifically discusses the Mis-
souri Supreme Court's treatment of this issue in its opinion in State ex reL Scott v. Roper,
688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), his discussion is relevant to both state and federal
court appointments. Fisch suggests that, historically, the inherent power of the courts to
compel appointments
has been founded typically on one or more of three arguments: (i) the lawyer is
an officer of the court, traditionally subject to judicial regulation and supervi-
sion, with an obligation to assist the courts in performing their responsibilities;
(ii) the lawyer enjoys the privilege of a monopoly on the practice of law, espe-
cially practice before the courts, and therefore cannot complain of having to
bear a fair share of the burden of making the courts accessible to all; and (iii)
the ethical rules of the self-regulating profession, as embodied in the Canons of
Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, but also in the concept of a profession, require such uncompensated
service.
Fisch, supra note 1, at 528 (citations omitted).
26. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 547 & nn. 100-05 (listing the various state in forma
pauperis statutes in effect in the 18th and 19th centuries).
27. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252 (statutory language discussed in
Fisch, supra note 1); see also Reply Brief for Petitioner, Mallard v. United States Dist.
Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File) (listing
the state statutes providing for an assignment or appointment of counsel in effect at the
time of the passage of the federal statute).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). Section 1915, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, pros-
ecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's
belief that he is entitled to redress.
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith ....
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable
to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is un-
true, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious ....
Id. § 1915(a), (d).
29. See supra note 4 (discussing the right to counsel in criminal cases as codified in 18
U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)).
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2. Judicial Interpretation of Section 1915(d)
From its introduction, the full scope of appointment power
under section 1915(d), as interpreted by the federal courts, has
lacked definition. The early cases were vague as to whether an ap-
pointment was mandatory or whether it could in fact be declined
by the appointed counsel.30 Moreover, later cases demonstrated
the continuing confusion, as district courts failed completely to ex-
ercise any section 1915(d) appointment power, on the premise that
either they had no authority to do so31 or a lack of compensation to
the appointed counsel negated the court's ability to appoint or re-
quest an attorney to serve. 2
Adding further to the confusion of the scope of appointment
power under section 1915(d), distinction was made, beginning in
the early twentieth century, between the requirements of appointed
30. See Whelan v. Manhattan Ry., 86 F. 219 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898), cited with ap-
proval in Mallard, 490 U.S. at 304 n.4 (for the proposition that attorneys are allowed to
decline court appointments). Specifically, Whelan posited:
[O]nce it is shown to the court that there is a cause of action "worthy of a trial,"
which plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, cannot prosecute without incur-
ring indebtedness, which such citizen is too poor to pay, then congress provides
a way whereby such poor person may have his day in court .... An attorney is
to be provided for him .... The attorney assigned by the court, in the event of
non success, will, of course, receive nothing; in the event of final success, he
may apply to the court for an order fixing a fair compensation for the services
he may actually render ....
... If the attorney who brought the action is willing to continue the litigation
on those terms, he will be assigned to represent plaintiff; if not, the court will
find some other attorney to prosecute her case.
Whelan, 86 F. at 220-21. But cf. Brief for the Respondent, Mallard v. United States Dist.
Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File) ("[tior
the first forty years after the enactment of section 1915(d), each decision used the word
'assign' to describe the statute") (citing United States ex rel. Randolph v. Ross, 298 F. 64
(6th Cir. 1924); Phillips v. Louisville & N.R.R., 153 F. 795 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), aff'd,
164 F. 1022 (5th Cir. 1908); Brinkley v. Louisville & NRR, 95 F. 345, 353 (C.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1899); Whelan, 86 F. at 221; Boyle v. Great N. Ry., 63 F. 539 (C.C.E.D. Wash.
1894)).
31. See, e.g., United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1986)
(district court erred in not considering litigant's request for counsel as it misconceived its
authority).
32. See, e.g., Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1984) (district court's
denial of request for appointment of counsel erroneously based on the ground that no
federal funds were available to pay counsel); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th
Cir. 1982) (lack of compensation for appointed counsel is not a consideration in district
court's decision to obtain counsel for indigent litigant), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214
(1983); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1982) (district court erred
by failing "entirely to exercise its discretion under section 1915(d) because it did not
recognize its authority to appoint counsel ... ; [t]he unavailability of funds to compensate
an appointed attorney seems to have been the major concern of the trial court, but this
has no bearing on the power of a court to provide counsel under section 1915(d)").
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counsel in criminal and civil cases.3 3 The broadened judicial con-
struction of rights protected by the sixth amendment's guarantee,
that "[iun all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence, ' 31 widened the apparent
constitutional gap between the rights of criminal and indigent civil
litigants.35 The logical extension of this reasoning provided that,
for both the court and the appointed attorney, a mandatory ap-
pointment in a criminal case was "more justifiable" than in a civil
case, given the rights at stake for a criminal defendant. 36 The fed-
eral courts thus accepted the proposition that there existed a con-
stitutional right to appointed counsel in criminal cases, but that no
such right prevailed in civil actions.37
With this in mind, the federal courts considered the reach of
section 1915(d) within the context of civil cases. Given the lack of
a constitutional requisite, indigent civil litigants were afforded ap-
33. See supra note 4.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932). In Powell, Justice Sutherland
stated:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite to due process of law
.... In a case such as this, whatever may be the rule in other cases, the right to
have counsel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the consti-
tutional right to be heard by counsel.
Id. (citations omitted).
36. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The
constitutional requirements for civil actions differ significantly from those for criminal
actions in which courts may appoint counsel. Federal criminal defendants facing impris-
onment are entitled to representation of counsel, and the power of courts to appoint
counsel for such defendants is thus necessary to preserve their constitutional rights.")
(citations omitted). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988) (court must "appoint" counsel to
indigent defendant in criminal case) with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) (court may "re-
quest" that counsel represent an indigent party in a civil matter).
37. See, e.g., Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47, 47 (6th Cir. 1956). The court in Reid
stated:
In contrast to a criminal proceeding, in which the court has a duty to "assign"
counsel to represent a defendant in accordance with his Constitutional right,
the court in a civil case has the statutory power only to "request an attorney to
represent" a person unable to employ counsel.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982)
("[t]here is little doubt that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil
case"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir.
1971) ("[iut is true that there exists no statutory or constitutional right for an indigent to
have counsel appointed in a civil case") (emphasis in original); Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428
F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[a]lthough 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes the court to
request an attorney to represent any person unable to employ counsel, the court is not
required to do so in a civil case").
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pointed counsel only at the district court's discretion a.3  As all sec-
tion 1915(d) appointments were considered discretionary, the
federal courts used a two-prong analysis to determine when an ap-
pointment of counsel was proper.
Hence, in the first prong, using what may be termed the "merit
prong," the courts considered whether the litigant's case warranted
an appointment of counsel. If this merit-prong analysis was met by
the litigant demonstrating an actionable claim worthy of an ap-
pointment of counsel, the courts then determined under the second
prong, the "authority prong," whether the court had authority
under section 1915(d) to authorize a compulsory assignment.
Therefore, under their merit-prong analysis, the courts in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits examined whether "excep-
tional circumstances" existed to warrant an appointment of coun-
sel in a civil case. 39 While the factors under this exceptional-
circumstances analysis varied,4° the courts looked primarily to the
litigant's likelihood of success on the merits4" and his ability to ar-
ticulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal
issues involved. 2
38. Martin-Trigona v. Larien, 737 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir. 1984) ("In non-criminal
cases federal courts have the authority to appoint counsel, but generally they are not
required to do so. The determination of whether appointment of counsel is necessary
rests with the discretion of the court."); Moss v. Thomas, 299 F.2d 729, 730 (6th Cir.
1962) ("while in contrast to a criminal proceeding in which there is a duty upon the
Court to assign counsel to represent an indigent defendant, a court in a civil case with
respect to the appointment of counsel is endowed with discretion").
39. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (tracing the develop-
ment of the "exceptional circumstances" analysis); 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 799; Whise-
nant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093
(9th Cir. 1980); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); Willett v. Wells, 469
F. Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1979).
40. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) (listing the
Maclin factors, see infra note 44, as factors to be considered under an exceptional-circum-
stances analysis).
41. Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1983) (inmate properly denied
appointed counsel for his section 1983 complaint; "[e]ven though the claim is not frivo-
lous, it does not follow that the indigent litigant has the right to the appointment of
counsel if his chances of success are extremely slim"); Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17
(5th Cir. 1982) (inmate properly denied appointed counsel for his section 1983 complaint
as there was "no showing ... that counsel [was] necessary to present meritorious issues to
the Court"); Willett, 469 F. Supp. at 751 (prisoner's request for appointment of counsel
properly denied when "likelihood of success in his action is highly dubious").
42. Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 1987) (even though district
court abused its discretion by failing to state its reason for denying inmate's motion for
appointment of counsel, error was harmless in that the litigant "was familiar with the
law, having represented himself on several occasions both in civil matters and in his crim-
inal case; ... and that he was capable of presenting his own case"); Wilborn, 789 F.2d at
1331 (denial of request for counsel upheld as litigant "neither demonstrated a likelihood
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The Seventh Circuit's merit-prong analysis, on the other hand,
at times employed two separate approaches, one holding that ap-
pointment of counsel was discretionary "unless denial would result
in fundamental unfairness impinging on due process rights"43 and
the other weighing certain factors" to determine whether appoint-
ment of counsel was appropriate.4 5
In yet another merit-prong analysis, the Eighth Circuit consid-
ered whether the circumstances properly justified an appoint-
ment.46 Furthermore, other federal appellate courts have used a
combination of the foregoing merit tests. 7 Finally, within all of
the above merit-prong analyses, courts have occasionally consid-
ered whether the litigant demonstrated to the court her attempts to
of success on the merits nor show[ed] that the complexity of the issues involved was
sufficient to require designation of counsel"); Cook, 518 F.2d at 780-81 (prisoner properly
denied appointed counsel as district court extended the litigant "considerable latitude in
questioning witnesses as well as making statements on his own behalf to the court and
jury").
In Wilborn however, the court noted its consternation with the requirements of the
exceptional-circumstances analysis, stating:
[W]e are troubled by what we perceive to be the incoherence of the two-pronged
inquiry into exceptional circumstances by which we are bound .... [We ques-
tion how a court reasonably can expect a strong showing by a [section] 1983
claimant on the first prong when it is manifestly unlikely that a pro se petitioner
involved in a complex case which he cannot litigate effectively would be capable
of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. Despite our misgivings,
we are bound by the law of this circuit.
Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 n.3 (emphasis in original).
43. Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978) (extending this rule as
enunciated in La Clair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1967) to section 1983
proceedings).
44. The factors to be considered, while not exhaustive, include: (1) the merits of the
indigent litigant's claim; (2) the nature of the factual issues raised in the claim; (3)
whether the evidence to be presented to the factfinder consists of conflicting testimony;
(4) capability of the indigent litigant to present the case; and (5) the complexity of the
legal issues raised by the complaint. Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir.
1981).
45. For cases adopting the Maclin factors, see McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315,
1320-21 (7th Cir. 1982); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983). For cases using both tests, see Howland, 833 F.2d at 646;
Childs, 705 F.2d at 922; Maclin, 650 F.2d at 886-89.
46. See, e.g., Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir.
1984) (requiring trial court to consider whether the plaintiff has alleged a valid prima
facie claim, "whether the plaintiff has in good faith attempted to retain counsel and has
been unsuccessful .... and whether the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well
as the court will benefit from the assistance of counsel"); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d
754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (trial court has authority to make an appointment of counsel "if
within the court's discretion the circumstances are such that would properly justify it").
47. See, e.g., Bemis v. Kelley, 857 F.2d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1988) (incorporating the
exceptional-circumstances test with factors from the Seventh Circuit's Maclin test).
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procure counsel 48 and whether appointing counsel would aid the
49court in its determination of the case.
Once the courts, using their various merit-prong analyses, deter-
mined that the civil litigant deserved an appointment of counsel,
they then considered, under the authority prong, whether or not
section 1915(d) authorized a compulsory assignment of counsel.
Early decisions drew no distinction between the courts' ability to
"request" or "appoint" attorneys in civil cases.50 Instead, these
cases emphasized the district court's discretion "to appoint" coun-
sel and did not specify whether such an appointment, if granted,
was mandatory or discretionary.5
Eventually, however, the federal appellate courts articulated va-
ried approaches to the scope of section 1915(d). 2 Under their au-
48. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1982) (case remanded for
determination by trial court of litigant's own attempts to secure counsel and whether
counsel should be appointed).
49. See, e.g., id. at 213 ("district court should also consider whether the appointment
of counsel would be a service to [the plaintiff] and, perhaps, the court and defendant as
well, by sharpening the issues in the case, shaping the examination of witnesses, and thus
shortening the trial and assisting in a just determination"); McKeever, 689 F.2d at 1321
("[lt will aid the court in the resolution of difficult legal issues if argument is presented
on both sides by competent counsel"); see also Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431
(7th Cir. 1978). The Heidelberg court explained:
We point out ... that it is extremely helpful to the court to have the plaintiff
represented by counsel in a case such as this [a prisoner's section 1983 action].
We ourselves requested counsel to serve on appeal. Although a court is under-
standably reluctant to impose on an attorney the burden of representing a party
in a civil case without a fee, the attorney who accepts such an appointment can
perform a valuable service, if only in preventing the waste of valuable judicial
time.
Id.
50. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 799 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982); Randle v. Victor Welding Supply
Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1981); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886-89 (7th
Cir. 1981); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); Bethea v. Crouse, 417
F.2d 504, 505 (10th Cir. 1969); and Moss v. Thomas, 299 F.2d 729, 730 (6th Cir. 1962)).
51. See, e.g., id. at 800 (illustrating the use of "to appoint" by courts in two separate
contexts: (1) "to appoint" meaning "to (compel] an attorney to represent an indigent
client, whether with or without compensation"; and (2) "to appoint" meaning "to desig-
nate a pro bono volunteer attorney as counsel of record for an indigent client").
52. Nevertheless, even in circuits that have since taken a stance on the scope of sec-
tion 1915(d), courts continue to use the terms "request" and "appoint" interchangeably.
See, e.g., id. at 802 & n. 10 (noting that it had used request and appoint interchangeably
and that other courts had cited these cases for the power of appointment under section
1915(d)); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Federal courts.., are
empowered by statute to appoint counsel when circumstances justify it. Section 1915 ...
authorizes a court to request an attorney .... ") (emphasis added). In proffering an
explanation for this interchange of "request" and "appoint," the Ninth Circuit stated:
[T]he district court is given considerable discretion in determining whether
counsel is necessary, so appellate reversal of trial court denials is ... rare. As a
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thority-prong analysis, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
looked to the statutory language of section 1915(d). These circuits
noted that section 1915(d) authorized the courts only to "request"
and not "appoint" representation, and thus emphasized the literal
distinction between these two terms. 53 In addition, these courts
stressed the constitutional differences between criminal and civil
indigent litigants. 54 From these findings, the Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits reasoned that section 1915(d) did not authorize
compulsory assignments of counsel.
In contrast, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits argued that section
1915(d) did authorize compulsory appointments." In so holding,
these circuits emphasized that the proper administration of justice
required such mandatory appointments.56 Further, the Eighth Cir-
cuit stressed the attorney's professional duty to provide public ser-
vice, noting that attorneys would accept mandatory appointments
result, courts at both levels often have little incentive to choose their language
carefully in ruling on section 1915(d) motions; it little matters to a litigant who
is denied counsel whether the court declines to "appoint" an attorney or merely
declines to "request" an attorney to serve.
30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 800.
53. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 801 ("In our view, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) does not author-
ize appointment of counsel to involuntary service. Several factors lead us to this conclu-
sion. Most persuasively, the plain language of the statute states that a court may 'request'
counsel for indigents.") (citation omitted); Caruth, 683 F.2d at 1049 ("a court has the
authority only to request an attorney to represent an indigent, not to require him to do
so") (emphasis in original); Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47, 47 (6th Cir. 1956) ("the court
in a civil case has the statutory power only to 'request an attorney to represent' a person
unable to employ counsel") (citation omitted).
54. See supra notes 37-38.
55. See, e.g., Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[a]lthough
[plaintiff] makes no claim that he has a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel
for civil litigation, the district court was authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to appoint
counsel"); id. n.3 ("[a]lthough the statute says that a court may 'request' an attorney to
represent an indigent defendant, the cases construe the statute as authorizing a court to
'appoint' counsel"); see also Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971) ("express
authority [is] given ... in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to appoint counsel in civil cases .... federal
courts do possess the statutory power to make this appointment").
56. See Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163-64 (district court's denial of inmate's request for
counsel on his section 1983 claim denied inmate a fundamentally fair trial); Shields v.
Jackson, 570 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that an appointment of counsel was
appropriate and would advance the proper administration of justice as inmate alleged an
actionable claim against the arresting police officer for taking inmate's property). In a
1971 case, the Eighth Circuit observed:
Plaintiff [a federal prisoner] is admittedly an indigent. For obvious reasons he
alone cannot investigate the case or hope to obtain evidence to prove his allega-
tions. The court will be aided by appearance of counsel at all proceedings.
These circumstances fully justify the appointment of counsel to represent plain-
tiff and a failure to do so would amount to an abuse of discretion.
Peterson, 452 F.2d at 758.
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to fulfill their professional obligations.57
III. THE MALLARD DECISION
Due to the conflicting interpretations given section 1915(d) by
the circuit courts, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Mallard v. United States58 to decide the scope of the federal
courts' appointment powers under section 1915(d).
A. The Facts of the Case
In January 1987, John E. Mallard was admitted to practice law
before the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 59 Six
months later, the Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP)6° asked Mal-
lard to represent two inmates and one former inmate in their sec-
tion 198361 claim against several prison guards and the prison
administration.62 After reviewing his potential clients' case file,
Mallard filed a motion to withdraw, claiming that he was unquali-
57. Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 1984) (dis-
approving of judges' reluctance to request lawyers to appear in pro bono litigation and
restating the Peterson court's confidence that attorneys will serve when assigned to do so).
The Peterson court observed:
Lawyers have long served in state and federal practice as appointed counsel
for indigents in both criminal and civil cases. The vast majority of the bar have
viewed such appointments to be integrally within their professional duty to pro-
vide public service. Only rarely are lawyers asked to serve in civil matters. We
have the utmost confidence that lawyers will always be found who will fully
cooperate in rendering the indigent equal justice at the bar.
Peterson, 452 F.2d at 758.
58. 488 U.S. 815 (1988).
59. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 299 (1989). Despite the infer-
ence that Mallard was a mere babe in the legal woods, Mallard graduated from law
school in 1980, practiced for several years in California, and then served as in-house
counsel to an Iowa corporation. Affidavit of John E. Mallard at 1, Traman v. Parkin,
No. 87-317-B (S.D. Iowa June 25, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
60. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 299. The Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP), a joint venture
of the Legal Services Corporation of Iowa and the Iowa Bar Association, participates in
supplying attorneys to represent indigents. After the Eighth Circuit required a program
to provide representation in pro bono situations, the Southern District of Iowa instituted a
program in conjunction with VLP to provide attorneys to represent clients in pro bono
cases, including in forma pauperis actions, under section 1915. Id. at 298 (citing Nelson,
728 F.2d at 1005).
Under this program, a qualifying attorney (one admitted to practice in federal court)
would only be eligible to be appointed every third year, consideration would be given to
geographical convenience, support services would be available concerning the substantive
and procedural law at issue, and the attorney could apply to the court for reimbursement
of out-of-pocket costs. Brief for the Respondent app. I, Mallard v. United States Dist.
Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
62. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 299.
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fled to handle the case.63 Mallard supported his withdrawal mo-
tion by citing his lack of litigation experience in general and with
section 1983 claims in particular." The VLP contested Mallard's
withdrawal, arguing that Mallard was competent to take the
case.65 After the magistrate denied Mallard's motion to withdraw,
Mallard sought relief from the district court.66
B. The Lower Courts' Decisions
The district court upheld the magistrate's decision declining to
allow Mallard to withdraw.67 In so holding, the judge rejected
Mallard's contention that he was insufficiently familiar with litiga-
tion to take the case, noting that Mallard's brief on his own behalf
evidenced his ability to represent the section 1983 plaintiffs.6  The
court further held that section 1915(d) empowers federal courts to
make compulsory appointments in civil cases. The district court
concluded, therefore, that Mallard had to serve as appointed
counsel.69
63. Specifically, Mallard sought
dismissal of his appointment on the grounds (a) that he was not competent to
represent the inmates based on his general lack of experience in litigation and
(b) that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) does not empower the District Court to require an
unwilling attorney to represent a person making a request for counsel
thereunder.
Statement of the Case, Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 488 U.S. 815 (1988)
(No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
64. Mallard's motion to withdraw stated:
I have no experience in litigation in cases such as the subject case which
involves multiple plaintiffs and defendants and requires substantial depositions
and an ability to prepare, examine, and cross examine numerous parties and
witnesses at trial....
. I am willing to volunteer my legal services for other volunteer lawyers projects with
the legal services program, in lieu of participating in the federal pro bono referral pro-
gram for which I am not qualified. Motion to Withdraw, Traman v. Parkin, No. 87-317-
B (S.D. Iowa June 25, 1987), as found in On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit app., Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S.
296 (1989) (No. 87-1490) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
65. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 299.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 300.
68. Id.; see also Ruling on Motion, Traman v. Parkin, No. 87-317-B (S.D. Iowa June
25, 1987) as found in Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 488 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 87-
1490) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File) ("Mallard can hardly claim incompetence
when he has filed an eighteen page brief in support of this motion that demonstrates
thorough research, careful reasoning, and effective writing.").
69. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300.
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Thus, in November 1987, on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Mallard requested a writ of mandamus "to compel the
district court to allow his withdrawal" from the case.70 Mallard's
writ of mandamus was denied without opinion by the Eighth Cir-
cuit.71 Mallard then petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted Mallard's
petition.72
C. The Opinion of the Court
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Eighth Circuit. The Court held that section 1915(d) does not au-
thorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments of coun-
sel; rather, it allows the courts only to request an attorney to serve
as counsel for an indigent civil litigant.73 Writing for the major-
ity, 74 Justice Brennan focused his analysis on the statutory lan-
guage of section 1915(d).75 In pertinent part, the statute provides
that "the court may request an attorney to represent any such per-
son unable to employ counsel."' 76 Justice Brennan emphasized that
interpretation of the word "request" in section 1915(d) was dispos-
itive of the issue.77
To determine the proper interpretation of the term "request,"
the majority considered the congressional intent in enacting section
1915(d). 78  The Court looked to the congressional floor debates
concerning the passage of the original statute in 189279 and con-
70. Id.
71. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, No. 87-2583 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 1987), rev'd,
490 U.S. 296 (1989).
72. 488 U.S. 815 (1988).
73. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 310.
74. Id. at 298. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Justice Kennedy filed
a concurring opinion. See id. at 310-11.
75. Id. at 300 ("[i]nterpretation of a statute must begin with the statute's language").
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982); see supra note 28 for the text of section 1915(d).
77. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 301.
78. The predecessor of section 1915(d) originally was passed in 1892. Act of July 20,
1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252, cited in Mallard, 490 U.S. at 306 n.5.
79. A brief filed by Mallard quoted the following exchange:
Mr. WILLIAM A. STONE. In a case where the plaintiff is wholly unable to
pay the costs where there is a judgment against him for the costs, how do the
officers get their pay?
Mr. CULBERSON. They do not get any in that event.
Mr. WILLIAM A. STONE. Then you are simply compelling the officers to do
that work for nothing.
Mr. CULBERSON. We are simply in these cases of charity and humanity
compelling these officers, all of whom make good salaries, to do this work for
1991]
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cluded that compelled service without compensation was not in-
tended by Congress.80
Further, the Court examined section 1915(d) in the context of
the other provisions of section 1915, noting that Congress had
mandated certain services by witnesses in in forma pauperis pro-
ceedings.8 From this, the Court reasoned that the use of the term
"request" in section 1915(d) was intentional and that if Congress
had wanted to "require" representation, it would have done So.8 2
Next, the Court considered various state statutes authorizing the
appointment of counsel that were in effect at the time the original
section 1915(d) was enacted. 3 Comparing these state statutes with
the federal legislation, the majority again suggested that Congress
understood the import of the linguistic distinction between "re-
quest" and "assign," and thus concluded that Congress did not
intend to compel mandatory representation.84 In addition, the
Court reviewed the English common law roots of appointed coun-
sel, observing that the "long-standing duty" of attorneys to provide
indigent representation is not as firmly planted in English tradition
as has been assumed.85
In its final comparison, the Court examined section 1915(d) in
light of other federal statutes authorizing appointments of coun-
sel.8 6 The Court concluded that the use of "assign" in the only
nothing. That is all the bill does. There may be one such case upon a docket of
five hundred; and they are not required to do much ex-officio service.
Reply Brief for the Petitioner app., Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296
(1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File) (citing 23 CONG. REC. 5199 (1892)).
80. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 302 & n.3. But see supra note 79. Read in context, the use
of "compel" by Mr. Culberson suggests that mandatory service in these "rare" cases was
indeed intended. Moreover, characterizing attorneys as officers of the court potentially
implies a duty to assist the court in every way.
81. The Court stated:
Whereas § 1915(d) merely empowers a court to request an attorney to represent
a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis, § 1915(c)--adopted at the very same
time as § 1915(d)-treats court officers and witnesses differently: "The officers
of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such
cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases .... "
Mallard, 490 U.S. at 301-02 (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982)).
82. Id. at 302.
83. Id. at 302-03. Justice Brennan noted that at the time of the 1892 act, 12 states
had statutes authorizing courts to "assign" or "appoint" attorneys to serve without com-
pensation, and not merely "requesting" them to do so.
84. Id. at 303-04 ("[it is nevertheless significant that no reported decision exists in
the above States prior to 1892 holding that a lawyer could not decline representation
without compensation, [suggesting] that Congress did not intend to replicate a system of
coercive appointments when it enacted § 1915(d)") (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 304 n.4 (citing Shapiro, supra note 1, at 749-62).
86. Id. at 305.
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federal appointment statute contemporaneous with the original
section 1915(d),87 as well as the use of "assign" and "appoint" in
later statutes, 8 evidenced the intent of Congress not to authorize
mandatory appointments of counsel.89
From the above considerations, the Court concluded that section
1915(d) authorizes federal courts only to request attorneys to serve
and does not compel them to do so.90 However, the Court then
stated that its interpretation "did not render section 1915(d) a nul-
lity." 9' The Court opined that in practice, section 1915(d) legiti-
mizes a court's request for an attorney to serve, in that the attorney
should understand that the request is appropriate and thus should
not be ignored or disregarded. 92 In essence, the Court suggested
that attorneys have a duty, as part of their ethical obligation to the
profession, to obey section 1915(d) court appointment requests. 93
In conclusion, the majority stressed that its holding was limited
to statutory interpretation of section 1915(d), suggesting that the
independent, individual duty of attorneys to represent indigent liti-
gants remains unscathed. 94 The Court reiterated that a section
1915(d) request should neither be taken lightly nor refused for any-
thing less than an ethical violation, such as a conflict of interest.95
Although the Court resolved the scope of the federal courts'
statutory appointment power under section 1915(d), the majority
nevertheless declined to address two crucial related issues. Specifi-
cally, the majority declined to decide the constitutionality of
87. The Court noted:
The sole federal statute antedating § 1915(d) that provided for court-ordered
representation allowed a capital defendant "to make his full defence by counsel
learned in the law" and stated that "the court before whom such person shall be
tried, or some judge thereof, shall.., immediately, upon his request... assign
to such person such counsel, not exceeding two, as such person shall
desire .... "
Id. at 305-06 (emphasis in original) (quoting Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 118
(current version codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988)).
88. Id. at 306 ("[e]very federal statute still in force that was passed after 1892 and
that authorizes courts to provide counsel states that courts may 'assign' or 'appoint' at-
torneys, just as did the 1790 capital representation statute").
89. Id. at 306-07.
90. Id. at 307.
91. Id. The Court rejected the contention that without a coercive reading, section
1915(d) was superfluous, noting that "[s]tatutory provisions may simply codify existing
rights or powers."
92. Id. at 308.
93. Id. at 310.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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mandatory appointments 96 and whether the federal courts have the
inherent authority, regardless of section 1915(d), to compel attor-
neys to serve.
97
D. The Concurrence
In his brief concurrence, Justice Kennedy re-emphasized the
Mallard opinion's function as one of statutory interpretation and
not one of defining the professional responsibilities of attorneys.98
Kennedy stressed that it is attorneys' "special status as officers of
the court" and their "traditional obligations" that require accept-
ance of court appointments, rather than the statutory language of
section 1915(d). 99
E. The Dissent
In dissent, Justice Stevens'0° first argued that the relationship
between a court and the members of its bar is not merely statu-
tory.101 Consequently, in the dissent's view, this particular case
concerned more than the interpretation of section 19 15(d).1 2 Spe-
cifically, the dissent argued that as a professional, an attorney's du-
ties exceed those provided by statute.10 3  In particular, Justice
Stevens stressed that traditionally, representation of indigents has
been required as a condition to bar membership and is firmly
96. The Court stated:
We do not decide today, whether, or under what conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 3005
or any other federal statute providing for the "assignment" or "appointment" of
counsel authorizes federal courts to compel an unwilling attorney to render ser-
vice. Nor do we offer an opinion on the constitutionality of compulsory
assignments.
Id. at 306 n.6.
97. Id. at 308 n.8, 310. Justice Brennan sidestepped the inherent-authority issue by
providing that the district court below had not invoked its inherent authority, nor had the
Eighth Circuit offered this as a ground for denying Mallard's writ of mandamus. Id
Justice Brennan observed, however, that the argument that the majority's reading of sec-
tion 1915(d) was superfluous would undermine the assertion that the courts already have
inherent power to compel unwilling attorneys to serve.
98. Id. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 310-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor
joined in the dissent.
101. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Concurrently, Justice Stevens noted that this case
did "not concern the sufficiency of the lawyer's reasons for declining an appointment or
the sanctions that may be imposed on an attorney who refuses to serve without compen-
sation." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[t]he duties of the practitioner are an amalgam of
tradition, respect for the profession, the inherent power of the judiciary, and the com-
mands that are set forth in canons of ethics, rules of court, and legislative enactments").
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rooted, at least in the United States, as a duty of the legal
community. 'o
Further, the dissent contested the majority's reading of the con-
gressional intent behind section 1915(d). 10 5 Rather than intending
a distinction between the federal and state courts' appointment au-
thority, the dissent argued that Congress meant to provide the
same appointment powers to the federal courts. 1°6 Noting that in
the original enactment of section 1915(d) Congress had used the
words "assign" and "request" interchangeably,"°7 Justice Stevens
concluded that the use of the term "request" had no particular
significance.' 0 Moreover, the dissent observed that the term "as-
sign" was used by the courts in their initial interpretations of the
section 1915(d) appointment power.'°9
Accordingly, the dissent rejected the majority's literal distinc-
tion between the federal section 1915(d) use of "request" and the
states' use of "appoint" or "assign.""10 Instead, Justice Stevens
maintained that Congress clearly intended that section 1915(d) au-
thorize mandatory appointments."'
Thus, the dissent concluded, based on the traditional duties of
attorneys and the congressional intent behind section 1915(d), the
proper construction of section 1915(d) would permit federal courts
to make mandatory appointments of counsel." 2 In the dissent's
104. Id. at 311-12 & nn.2-4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Supreme Court v. Piper,
470 U.S. 274, 287 (1985) ("a nonresident bar member, like the resident member, could be
required to represent indigents and perhaps to participate in formal legal-aid work");
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) (noting that representation of indigent crimi-
nal defendants is a condition of Virgin Island bar membership); and People ex rel. Karlin
v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (Justice Cardozo recognizing
that "[m]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions" including that of
representing indigents without compensation)).
105. Id at 314-15 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. The dissent stated:
Congress intended to "open the United States courts" to impoverished liti-
gants and "to keep pace" with the laws of these "[m]any humane and enlight-
ened States." Congress also intended to insure that the rights of litigants suing
diverse parties in the most liberal of these States would not be defeated by the
defendant's removal of the suit to federal court.
Id. at 314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1892)).
107. Id. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("federal statute was introduced in the
House and the Senate as an Act empowering courts to 'assign' counsel for poor persons")
(quoting 23 CONG. REC. 5199, 6264 (1892)).
108. Id. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 30.
110. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 316-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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view, this interpretation of section 1915(d) appointments would
"require counsel to serve, absent good reason,""' 3 when asked to
do so by the court.114
Moreover, the dissent contended that in this particular case,
Mallard's admission to the bar was premised on his acceptance of
an obligation to participate in the court's representation for indi-
gents program. 1 5 Accordingly, the dissent construed the court's
formal request to Mallard as "tantamount to a command."' 6 In
conclusion, Justice Stevens surmised that the power of the federal
courts to appoint counsel had a firm tradition and should not be
disrupted by so literal a reading of the word "request.""' 7
IV. ANALYSIS
While Mallard defined the scope of statutory appointment
power under section 1915(d), the opinion quite significantly did not
decide what power the federal courts retain, outside of section
1915(d), to compel mandatory representation for indigent civil liti-
gants. Specifically, the Mallard opinion leaves open two questions:
(1) the constitutionality of mandatory appointments" 8 and (2) the
federal courts' inherent power to compel representation.' '9
A. The Constitutionality of Mandatory Appointments
If Mallard had held compulsory assignments unconstitutional,
that decision would have determined the scope of section 1915(d)
and concluded any further inquiry into the appointment powers of
the federal courts. However, by declining to address the constitu-
tionality of mandatory appointments, 20 Mallard left undisturbed
prior Court decisions that approved the constitutionality of such
113. The dissent explained:
There are, of course, many situations in which a lawyer may properly decline
such representation. He or she may have a conflict of interest, may be engaged
in another trial, may already have accepted more than a fair share of the un-
compensated burdens that fall upon the profession, or may not have the qualifi-
cations for a particular assignment.
Id. at 311 & n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that this last reason was
given by Mallard to support his motion to withdraw and was rejected by the district
court.
114. Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 306 n.6; see also supra note 96.
119. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 308 n.8, 310; see also supra note 97.
120. See supra note 12 for an overview of the arguments concerning the constitution-
ality of mandatory appointments, with or without compensation. While there are several
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appointments. For example, in Hurtado v. United States,1 2' the
Court endorsed the notion that mandatory appointments do not
constitute a taking without just compensation violative of the fifth
amendment. 122
Although valid arguments exist on both sides of the takings is-
sue, those arguments that contend that mandatory representation
is constitutional are often grounded upon the notion that attorneys,
as officers of the court, are professionally obligated to provide indi-
gent representation. 23 In these terms, an attorney is provided a
right to practice law only to the extent licensed by the bar; if prac-
ticing law is conditioned upon representing indigents, there has
been no taking from an individual attorney, as an unconditional
right to practice was never granted initially. Hence, the attorney's
property right in practicing law is merely definitional; if the courts
and the bar put conditions on that right to practice, then there has
been no taking when an attorney is appointed to represent an
indigent.
Therefore, assuming that mandatory appointments are constitu-
tional, the issue becomes whether the federal courts retain power,
in light of Mallard and its construction of section 1915(d), to com-
pel an unwilling attorney to represent indigent civil litigants.
B. The Significance of Inherent Authority
By addressing only the statutory appointment power under sec-
constitutional challenges, the most contested one concerns whether mandatory represen-
tation violates the fifth amendment's guarantee of no taking without just compensation.
121. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
122. Id. at 588-89 ("the Fifth Amendment does not require that the Government pay
for the performance of a public duty it is already owed... [for example] representation of
indigents by court-appointed attorney") (citing United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966)).
123. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966). While Dillon specifically concerned representation for a criminal defendant,
the court in that case broadly stated:
[T]he obligation of the legal profession to serve indigents on court order is an
ancient and established tradition, and... appointed counsel have generally been
compensated, if at all, only by statutory fees which would be inadequate under
just compensation principles, and which are usually payable only in limited
types of cases .... [Riepresentation of indigents under court order, without a
fee, is a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the
court .... An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to
be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know
that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to
represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order.
1991]
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tion 1915(d), 1 24 the Court in Mallard increased the potential signif-
icance of the inherent powers of the federal courts to appoint
mandatory representation in civil cases. While Justice Brennan
limited the federal courts' appointment power under section
1915(d) to an ability to "request" attorney services, he nevertheless
stressed the ethical duty of individual lawyers to step up and take
these requested assignments. 125  By urging attorneys not to take
court-requested appointments lightly,'26 Justice Brennan tacitly
embraced Justice Stevens's assertion that there exists more than a
statutory relationship between attorneys and the judiciary.' 27 This
view was emphasized further by Justice Kennedy, who in his con-
currence 'stressed that attorneys have duties that emanate from
their unique status as officers of the court. 2 Thus, to argue incon-
sistently that the courts have merely statutory power to request,
but that an attorney's obligation to accept is greater, implies the
existence of an inherent power on the part of the courts to compel
representation.
Moreover, the majority's enumeration of valid factors that allow
attorneys to decline appointments 21 further evidences that the
courts' power in this regard is more than statutory. Justice Bren-
nan suggested that, originally, Congress intentionally used the
term "request" to allow attorneys to decline representation for eth-
ical reasons.130 Yet, under Mallard, if a court's request is just that,
a request, and hence optional, why stress the significance of an at-
torney's reason for refusal? Therefore, despite Mallard's holding
that section 1915(d) does not allow mandatory appointment of
counsel, the implications within the Mallard opinion, as well as the
majority's reliance on the unique status of attorneys, suggest that
the federal courts retain inherent authority to appoint counsel for
indigent civil litigants.
As noted previously, prior caselaw suggests that courts have in-
124. See supra notes 96-97.
125. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 ("[wle do not mean to
question, let alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor
to afford counsel, or to suggest that requests made pursuant to § 1915(d) may be lightly
declined because they give rise to no ethical claim").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Stevens noted the tradi-
tions behind the relationship between the bench and bar, giving force to the argument
that courts retain their inherent authority to appoint representation after Mallard.
128. Id. at 310-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 303, 310.
130. Id. at 303 (attorneys should decline a request "if in their view their personal,
professional, or ethical concerns bid them do so") (emphasis added).
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voked their inherent authority to appoint counsel only in criminal
cases. 131 This same inherent authority, however, should be equally
invocable in civil cases, as the basis for inherent authority is not
constitutional or statutory, but rather is grounded in the adminis-
tration of the judiciary. 32 To say that a court can appoint repre-
sentation for a criminal defendant due to his constitutional right
misstates the argument. A court's inherent authority to administer
justice should always be available, regardless of the "type" of case
before it. Such rigid adherence to this perceived constitutional dis-
tinction between criminal and civil indigent litigants results in the
civil litigant being denied justice.
In practice, the federal courts' use of this inherent power would
be employed on the same discretionary basis as their power invo-
cable under section 1915(d). Thus, the indigent civil litigant would
first have to demonstrate a colorable claim. Only if this threshold
were met would the court then consider using its inherent author-
ity to appoint an attorney to represent the indigent civil litigant. 33
Accordingly, Mallard illustrates the anomaly inherent in al-
lowing a skilled attorney to decline a court appointment for repre-
sentation of an indigent civil litigant. That John Mallard was
competent enough to argue his case before the United States
Supreme Court certainly suggests his competence to represent
prison inmates in their section 1983 claims. As a practical matter,
courts recognize that certain factors, such as financial burden or
excessive case load, will excuse an attorney from accepting an ap-
pointment. However, absent such a legitimate excuse, federal
courts do retain the inherent authority to require an attorney to
accept indigent civil appointments.
131. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
132. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 79 (1965); see also supra note 25.
133. In McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1325 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing), Judge Posner suggests that there "should be a presumption against appointing coun-
sel in a prisoner's civil rights suit." Instead, Judge Posner argues, the burden placed on
the legal profession, judges, and prison administrators by prisoners' civil rights cases, and
prisoner requests for appointed counsel, require that the marketplace be the true testing
ground for whether a prisoner has a meritorious claim. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting)
Fisch challenges this argument as extended to the denial of appointed representation
for all indigent civil litigants, not just prisoners. Specifically, Fisch argues:
It is one thing to insist that a plaintiff undergo such a market test-assuming
that it is a market to which the plaintiff has been given fair and full access-
prior to invoking the court's discretion so as to avoid forcing a lawyer to take a
case someone else would be willing to take voluntarily. It is quite another to
deny the court any power to override the results of the [marketplace] test.
Fisch, supra note 1, at 541.
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V. IMPACT
The Court's Mallard opinion has done little to clarify the ap-
pointment powers of the federal courts. Precisely because the
Court did not reach the inherent authority issue, the full scope of
the federal courts' appointment power remains undefined. Thus,
the practical effect of the Mallard holding remains unclear. Fed-
eral courts may continue to make mandatory appointments, rely-
ing on their inherent authority rather than section 1915(d), or they
may actually lessen their number of section 1915(d) requests, de-
pending on the availability of volunteer legal counsel.
In either event, it is apparent that the potential for the federal
courts to utilize their inherent authority remains. In a recent case
decided by the United States Supreme Court, attorneys in the Dis-
trict of Columbia who served as court-appointed counsel for indi-
gent defendants in criminal cases boycotted the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia to force an increase in their compensa-
tion.1 34 While the main issue concerned antitrust considerations,
Justice Blackmun intimated that the attorneys could be compelled
to serve, regardless of an increase in compensation.1 35 In so doing,
Justice Blackmun returned to the attorneys' duty to serve either as
a condition of practicing law in the District of Columbia or
through contempt proceedings. 36 Justice Blackmun also stated
that such a view was not inconsistent with Mallard, specifically
noting that Mallard had not addressed the power of the federal
courts' inherent authority to compel attorneys to serve. 137
VI. CONCLUSION
For the majority of licensed attorneys, the issue of mandatory
appointment is seemingly irrelevant. Indeed, for most practition-
ers, the question of the courts' power to compel an attorney to
represent an indigent litigant may appear to be a purely academic
exercise. However, the relevance of this issue may soon be brought
to bear as more states consider the imposition of mandatory pro
bono publico work 38 and as local rules require this duty of repre-
134. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
135. Id. at 453 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 454 footnote following n.9 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
138. Chambers, Lawyers Find Loopholes in Pro Bono, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 1, 1990, at 13,
col. 3 (discussing New York's consideration of a mandatory pro bono program evidencing
a re-emphasis upon this issue); see also Taylor, Texans Make Pro Bono Pitch, NAT'L L.J.,
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sentation as an obligation for admission to that particular bar. 39
Thus, the parameters of when a court can compel an appointment
and when an attorney is required to serve become important.
While explicitly interpreting section 1915(d), Mallard does little
to define the courts' inherent powers in this area. By emphasizing
the traditional duties of attorneys, the Court suggests that the judi-
ciary retains its inherent power to compel appointments. As a
practical matter, the analyses previously employed by the circuits
will change little. A district court will analyze the case and deter-
mine, in its discretion, whether the indigent civil litigant is entitled
to appointment of representation. If the litigant is entitled to an
appointment, the court will then attempt to secure such counsel.
The difficulty lies in the cases in which no volunteer counsel can be
obtained to take the case. In this situation, the court must exercise
the inherent power it hopefully has, or leave justice
unadministered.
LAURA B. HARDWICKE
Apr. 1, 1991, at 3, col. 1 (discussing a class action suit brought by Texas attorneys to
force the State Bar of Texas to institute a mandatory pro bono program).
139. For example, the application for admission to the trial bar for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois provides the following:
Note: Trial Bar membership carries with it an obligation for pro bono ser-
vice. Pursuant to General Rule 3.31 of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, "Every member of the Trial Bar is to be available
for appointment by the court to represent or assist in the representation of those
who cannot afford to hire a member of the trial bar."
Instructions for Completing Trial Bar Petition, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (available from United States District Court, Attorney Ad-
missions Coordinator).
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